John Graves Simcoe, 1752-1806 Read online

  Captain Shank now led a charge on the enemy flank and broke it up. Trumpeter Barney dismounted and took prisoner a French officer, who commanded one of the divisions. The enemy cavalry was totally scattered and they retired. Many were dismounted and would have been captured, but a blast of fire from the woods drove the Highland company from their cover. The same blast of fire protected the enemy cavalry and allowed them to escape. At the first shot, Simcoe ordered the infantry into column on the road towards the rebels, except for the light company and Captain Ewald’s detachment. Those two were on the right, headed for the woods, ready to outflank the enemy by the length of their line.

  Prisoners informed Simcoe that the rebels were coming in force, and that Lafayette, Wayne and von Steuben were not far behind the vanguard of riflemen. Simcoe employed his usual tactics against riflemen, by rushing them, and then:

  if each separate company kept itself compact, there was little danger, even should it be surrounded, from troops who were without bayonets, and whose object was to fire a single shot with effect: the position of an advancing soldier was calculated to lessen the true aim of the first shot, and rapidity to prevent the rifleman, who requires some time to load, from giving a second; or at least to render his aim uncertain, and his fire by no means formidable.2

  Simcoe withdrew the cavalry from rebel range, and directed Captain Althaus, and his rifle company that was mounted, to dismount and check them if they sallied from the wood in pursuit of the Hussars. He ordered Captain Branson to go with the drivers and cattle to Williamsburg, because his red coat made him a target. He then ordered Lieutenant Adam Allen, acting as quartermaster, after he attended to the baggage, to have trees cut down for a barricade behind which the Rangers could rally.

  The troops pulled down fences on the Jamestown road, in the rear of the cavalry, so that if retreat to Williamsburg were blocked, they could escape by that route. Next, Simcoe moved the cavalry down the hill towards the Jamestown road, and they reascended the hill at Lee’s farm, “made a display of the whole force” then fell back behind the hill, leaving in front only a detachment of Hussars, both to prevent the left from being turned without notice, “and to deceive the enemy into a belief that the whole cavalry (whose force they had already felt) were behind the eminences, waiting for an opportunity to fall upon their right flank.”

  He directed the rest of the cavalry, undiscovered, to the road and formed them up out of sight and reach of the enemy, partly on the road and partly on its left. Beyond Captain Ewald’s flank was open ground which Simcoe could see from the eminence. If the enemy appeared in the open, the cavalry could swoop down. The cavalry was also ready, in case the infantry gave way, to flank the enemy if they came in pursuit from the wood:

  the best substitute for want of reserve, which from the extent of the woods and the enemy’s numbers, had been thrown into the line. Upon the left of the road the three pounder was placed, the amuzette [light rifled field piece] having broken down. There too the Highland company had retired.

  The rebels now appeared in force, lining the fences on the edge of the wood, by echelons, but when a cannon shot sounded they did not advance. Simcoe did not think he could win a fight, but he was determined to try, by placing a line along the wood to check the enemy advance long enough to allow the convoy ahead of him on the road to reach Williamsburg in safety. Then he would withdraw after the convoy. He had great confidence in the men he led — “disciplined enthusiasts in the cause of their country, and who, having been ever victorious, thought it impossible to suffer defeat.” He also admired the coolness and courage of Captain Ewald and his Jaegers. “I will take care of the left; while Ewald lives, the right flank will never be turned.”3

  “Fortune now decided in favour of the British troops”: The road from Norwal’s Mills was enclosed with high, strong fences. A body of enemy infantry was coming down the right of the road, and when Simcoe sent his infantry northward, the rebels clambered over the fences to save themselves. Once in the wood beyond the fences, Captain Ewald turned their left flank and his firing sent them fleeing in utmost confusion. Unfortunately, Ewald’s riflemen were not supported by bayonetmen who could have dealt a more severe blow before the rebels could rally. Instead the Hussars had to charge. Cornet Jones, who led the first assault, was killed: “He was an active, sensible, promising officer.”

  The mounted riflemen of the Queen’s Rangers charged with Capt. Shank: the gallant Sergeant McPherson, who led them, was mortally wounded. Two of the men of this detachment were carried away by their impetuousity so far as to pass beyond the enemy, and their horses were killed: they, however, secreted themselves in the wood under some fallen logs, and when the enemy fled from the spot they returned in safety to the corps.4

  Here is a rare instance where Simcoe mentioned having mounted riflemen. Usually they were on foot. Trumpeter Barney was wounded. “Captain [Francis] Stephenson was distinguished as usual: his chosen men and well trained light infantry were obstinately opposed: but they carried their point with the loss of a fourth of their numbers, killed and wounded.” Captain John McGill was leading the grenadier company, who showed their gallantry. Captain Robert McCrea (M’Rae) reported that his subaltern, Lieutenant Charles Dunlop

  Who had served in the Queen’s Rangers from thirteen years of age, led his division on horseback, without suffering a man to fire, watching the enemy, and giving a signal to his men to lay down whenever a party of their’s was about to fire: he arrived at the fence where the enemy had been posted with his arms loaded, a conduct that might have been decisive of the action: fortunately he escaped unhurt.5

  Simcoe’s losses were ten killed and twenty-three wounded, among the latter Lieutenant Swift Armstrong and Ensign [Cornet] [William] Jarvis. The Jaegers’ losses were one killed and two or three wounded. He noted that service with light troops “gives the greatest latitude for exertion of individual talents and of individual courage … every officer, every soldier had his share in the merit of the action: mistake in the one might have brought on cowardice in the other …”

  Lt. Col. Simcoe has ever considered this action as the climax of a campaign of five years, as the result of true discipline acquired in that space by unremitted diligence, toil, and danger, as an honourable victory earned by veteran intrepidity.6

  Simcoe never mentioned Colonel Richard Butler as the commander who opposed him. He must surely have known, but he saw no reason to dignify him by name. Rebel losses out of 570 engaged were calculated at nine killed, fourteen wounded, and thirty-two captured. Lafayette attributed rebel success to riflemen. Again, Simcoe repeated:

  The riflemen, however dexterous in the use of arms, were by no means the most formidable of the rebel troops; their not being armed with bayonets, permitted their opponents to take liberties with them which otherwise would have been highly improper.

  Simcoe began to draw away and collect his force, informing Captain Ewald of his plan to retreat to Williamsburg. Examination of the prisoners taken indicated that Lafayette, von Steuben and Wayne, perhaps all three, were not far behind. Lacking wagons, he left the wounded at Spencer’s Ordinary, with a surgeon’s mate, under a flag of truce. The infantry filed off to the right and the cavalry closed the rear. The party reached a brook, where Lieutenant Allen, with the pioneers, had cut down some trees and was preparing defences. Fortunately, Lord Cornwallis met them less than two miles into their march. After examining the prisoners and his officers’ intelligence, he concluded that the enemy, ready to act, were at least 1,200 strong, three times his strength — an overestimate of Colonel Richard Butler’s numbers. At the same time, Lafayette’s army was not far off.

  Simcoe’s detachment had marched twenty-eight miles without provisions. Fearful for the fate of his wounded, he galloped back to Spencer’s Ordinary. He was in time; the rebels had not come and his wounded were where he had left them. He found a large foraging party with wagons in which he placed his wounded and dead. Simcoe observed that had it not been for the small
battle at Spencer’s Ordinary, this foraging party would have been mistaken for Cornwallis’s advance guard, and most likely destroyed.

  Cornet Jones and the other dead were buried with full military honours on 28 June at Williamsburg. That day, with public orders, Simcoe received a commendation:

  Lord Cornwallis desires Lieut. Col. Simcoe will accept of his warmest acknowledgements for his spirited and judicious conduct in the action of the 26th instant, when he repulsed and defeated so superior a force of the enemy. He likewise desires that Lt. Col. Simcoe will communicate his thanks to the officers and soldiers of the Queen’s Rangers, and to Captain Ewald and the detachment of Yagers.7

  SEVEN

  “THIS ILL-MANAGED WAR”

  Soon after the fight at Spencer’s Ordinary, Simcoe undoubtedly realised that the British Army would soon suffer another ignominious defeat similar to Burgoyne’s disaster at Saratoga in October 1777. Cornwallis was withdrawing back to Portsmouth, expecting Sir Henry Clinton to send reinforcements from New York. The rebel campaign in the south was under overall command of General Nathaniel Greene; von Steuben, Lafayette and Wayne were his subordinates. Cornwallis knew he could not defeat the enemy if Washington moved south. French troops had arrived in Rhode Island, and Simcoe wondered whether, with French help, Washington would attack New York, or come to Chesapeake Bay to strike at Cornwallis. By 14 July most of the Cornwallis’s army was at Portsmouth.

  The Queen’s Rangers embarked on ships to take part in an attack on Philadelphia. After Clinton countermanded the order, they were landed at Yorktown. Cornwallis was now asking to be allowed to return to South Carolina, to relieve Lord Rawdon, who was ill and had been ordered home to convalesce. Instead, Clinton ordered General Alexander Leslie, then in command at Portsmouth, to go to Charleston, taking with him two more troops of Queen’s Rangers — Hussars under Captain Thomas Cooke and Lieutenant Adam Allan. Still at Charleston were the troopers under Captain John Saunders and Cornet Thomas Merritt. Clinton next ordered Cornwallis to detach part of his army to reinforce New York, on the assumption that Washington and his French allies would attack him. Cornwallis refused, because he was so short of able-bodied troops himself. Simcoe, too, was far from well. His Rangers were close to exhaustion, and still constantly on patrol out of Yorktown and conducting raids against the rebel outposts. The Colonel sent a request to Cornwallis, that if any troops were to be detached for New York, would he please send the Rangers. His corps badly needed a rest. Simcoe was feeling the effects of the long campaign personally, and wounds that had never fully healed were causing him considerable pain.

  Cornwallis refused because he could not do without the constant patrols. To his distaste, he had already yielded to Benedict Arnold’s demands to let him take his American Legion back to New York.1 Looking about him at Yorktown, Simcoe saw it as a very poor defensive site. He recalled General Phillips, before his death, enquiring what strength of garrison would be required to hold Yorktown. Simcoe had replied that no less than 2,000 men might prevent it falling to the rebel force.

  He recalled that Benedict Arnold, more pugnacious, had told Phillips that 4,000 would be required.2 Whether Arnold made that recommendation on another occasion, or was present, is not clear. Simcoe had to agree that even 2,000 was too many, considering Phillips’s other priorities. Yet probably not for the first time, and certainly not the last, Simcoe was recommending a strength far above what his superiors and the politicians in government were willing to contemplate.

  In South Carolina, Captain John Saunders had been very active. He had tangled with, among others, Francis Marion, “the Swamp Fox.” General Marion operated in the low-lying zones around Charleston with their pervading aura of methane gas. Cornet Merritt, out foraging, had been attacked by a superior force of rebels. Left for dead, recovering consciousness, Merritt managed to escape with the loss of his boots, helmet and arms. Later he was captured. Sent with a flag of truce to carry a letter from Colonel Nisbet Balfour to General Marion, Merritt was detained in retaliation for the detention of a rebel captain:

  They crammed Merrit [sic], with about twenty others, sergeants and privates of different British regiments, in a small, nasty, dark place, made of logs, called a bullpen; but he was not long here before he determined to extricate himself and his fellow prisoners, which he thus effected …

  Merritt saw his chance when the rebel guards became alarmed because they heard that a party of British had come near. He ordered the strongest of the prisoners to seize their sentry, who was posted at a small square hole cut through the logs, which served as both door and window. He pulled the astonished sentry through the hole with one hand, and threatened to cut his throat with a large knife, which he held in the other, if he made the smallest resistance or outcry. Merritt and the others crawled out of the hole, one by one, and the Cornet drew them into line. When challenged by the officer of the guard, Merritt threatened to cut the rebel guards to pieces if a single shot as fired. Although having only the sentry’s weapons, and through intimidation, they marched to a nearby river. They found a rice boat which took them safely to George Town, a sub-headquarters on the coast some fifty miles north of Charleston.3 The British were fairly secure in Charleston and Savannah, but the countryside around was dangerous as the rebels controlled more and more of the rural and unsettled areas.

  By 2 June, Simcoe had a most unpleasant matter on his hands. While he had much cause to trust his Rangers, they were not perfect. From “Price Mile” Simcoe sent a letter to Lord Cornwallis, reporting on the appalling conduct of two of his men:

  My Lord,

  I have not the least doubt but that Jonathan Webster & Lewis Terrpan [sic] private Dragoons in Captain [Thomas Ivie] Cooke’s troop of Queen’s Rangers, were guilty of a rape on Jane Dickinson yesterday. I have the honor to be, My Lord, with great respect your most obdt & most humble servt.

  J. Graves Simcoe

  L. Coll. Commdr. Queen’s Rangers.

  Simcoe saw that the two culprits were executed for their crime. Of interest here is Simcoe’s signature. On nearly all his letters he used J.G. Simcoe. Here he included Graves. This may be another indication that he was known as Graves to his intimates, rather than John.4

  While Clinton stewed in New York about the danger of an attack by Washington, he felt he could send little aid to Cornwallis. By 2 August 1781 the army in Virginia had pulled back to Yorktown. The Queen’s Rangers and Tarleton’s British Legion infantry were moved across the mouth of the York River to the Gloucester peninsula. Now Cornwallis awaited reinforcements from Clinton. His army was depleted to 7,400, many not remotely fit for duty. Clinton was slow to respond to rumours that Washington and his French ally, General Rochambeau, were marching for Virginia. At sea a large French fleet commanded by Admiral de Grasse was drawing close to the mouth of Chesapeake Bay, which would effectively bottle up Cornwallis’s entire army.

  Meanwhile, the badly weakened Rangers and Tarleton’s infantry were holding back a force of 1,500 rebel militia on the Gloucester side of the York River. Finally, Clinton’s intelligence informed him of the large scale move by Washington and General Rochambeau, his subordinate, and he prepared to set sail for Chesapeake Bay with 7,000 reinforcements. The British fleet was under the command of Admiral Thomas Graves, a cousin of Simcoe’s godfather, Samuel, and his personal friend. Clinton was far too late. On 5 September De Grasse’s fleet, well ahead of the British, had reached the entrance to the Chesapeake and was proceeding to establish a blockade.

  The situation on Gloucester peninsula became more serious when French Lancers and Hussars joined the Virginia militiamen at worrying Simcoe’s and Tarleton’s much weakened garrison. French troops, ferried from De Grasse’s ships, had been landing at Jamestown, while washington’s army, more than 8,000 strong and the French force under Rochambeau, had marched overland. Washington, as the commander in chief, would soon have control of some 15,000 troops surrounding the British defences of Yorktown.

  By early October the s
ituation was truly hopeless. Admiral Thomas Graves’s fleet was barred from landing Clinton and his 7,000 reinforcements which might have turned the tide. Helpless, Clinton ordered the fleet to return to New York, and Simcoe began working out a plan to escape while there might still be time. He would mount his entire regiment, break through the opposing militia and French, and drive straight north, to cross the Susquehanna and Delaware Rivers and continue along the best route he could find to Staten Island. With so much country wooded and peopled only by scattered, small settlements, he would have a good chance of success. He sent the plan to Cornwallis, who called him to a meeting and enquired whether Simcoe really thought he could escape with the cavalry. “Without the smallest doubt,” the Colonel replied with a complete confidence that masked certain qualms.5

  He was far from well, and he could not help wondering whether he would endure long days in the saddle, winter clearly not far off and ill supplied with whatever his foraging Rangers could find. Such winter clothing as the Rangers had possessed was threadbare or long lost. In fact, he was so ill that Tarleton, who had moved his cavalry to Gloucester, had taken over command of all their men. Cornwallis denied Simcoe permission to make his escape attempt. The entire army, he decreed, must share the same fate.6 Simcoe could not help contrasting such a pigheaded outlook with that of Burgoyne, who had encouraged his Provincials to escape from Saratoga. Their Colonel was fearful that his loyal, hard working Rangers, and the other regiments of the American and Provincial establishments, faced punishment as traitors if they fell into the hands of their rebel enemies. By 1781 he had in his ranks some British regulars who had transferred to the Rangers, but the vast majority of his men were still colonials.